It's like Claudia from Interview with the Vampire, it can only end in tears.
It's like Claudia from Interview with the Vampire, it can only end in tears.
I think people are getting stuck on objective truth vs. subjective truth. Yes, objectively, the clone is a clone and the original is the original. Subjectively, they're the same.
Let's say we're both connected to the outside world via an interface much as this one and that this text-based medium is our only means of interaction with the rest of the world.
Since in that situation there would be no viable way to distinguish between the two of us then, yes, we would both be me.
Obviously we would start to diversify the moment we became seperate entities and before long we would not be exactly the same anymore, but there would be no way to tell us apart.
If however people were able to see which is the construct and which is the flesh and blood then, no, the construct would not be me. Though for all intents and purposes it would be a sentient and sapient human being and turning it off would be a crime akin to murder, under the condition that he would want to remain alive and I cannot see a construct that has an exact copy of my brain including memories ever consenting to being turned off.
It's a very interesting topic of conversation. It touches on what it is to be human. I feel that these questions have been thoroughly explored in science fiction, for example in the story Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep by Phillip K. dike and Nul-A by van Voght. I believe a strong point can be made arguing that memory is equal to identity and that any structure capable of perfectly simulating self-awareness is in fact self-aware.
Alright. You have a doting wife and she's holding a colt 1911 infront of you and your clone, Merari. With tears in her eyes, she shoots you.
you're dead. Your clone lives out the rest of his life with your wife.
Then a version of me gets to live. Which is not as good as the both of us, but better than none.
I don't believe you're actually that selfless and disconnected from your own sense of self preservation.
I'm not and I would not want to die. But you presented me with a scenario in which I was already dead but another me got to live.
I am not saying that construct wouldn't be a sentient being, or that it would be different from you, at least at the very moment it was created. What I'm saying is - it would not be you. Your awareness of yourself would remain in your own brain.
This.
It isn't you, no matter how much it believes it is you.
hahahaha
And it would also be in the other brain.
Memory equals identity.
Amusingly, the movie was named Oblivion and I was hoping it was originally an Elder Scrolls movie.
The premise being about a clone remembering his wife and his wife dealing with it.
Amongst other stuff.
The movies assertion being the clone is her husband in every way which matters, even when he gets killed two more times.
By having a perfect copy of your memories and emotional state made.
Consciously, you're two separate points of observation and perception.
In the physical sense, you're two different examples of the same phenomenon/person.
You only become different with more experiences.
Which is the function of Nick Valentine's quest.
He *IS* the original Nick Valentine reincarnated.
He's also different.
In psychology, sociology, and anthropology, identity is a person's conception and expression of their own (self-identity) and others' individuality or group affiliations (such as national identity and cultural identity).
A person's conception.
But what is a conception?
Conception, or a concept, is an abstract idea or a mental symbol.
Ah. So, not a fact.
No he isn't. He even tells you he isn't.
That's still just some other person that has the same ideas as I do. I am not influencing their brain processes anymore the nanosecond they're 'separated' from me.
Bingo.
That doesn't make you right. That makes you an ass hole.
All of which is achieved through memory. Memory equals identity.
You wouldn't be able to tell the difference between two people with the same memories and emotional responses though. Functionally, they are the same. Influencing their thought processes is irrelevant.
This is the identity of indiscernibles and it is a basic axiom of ontology.
Yes. but identity is not fact. It's just an idea.
But identity is the issue. Your copy is a person in their own right. It's no longer you, because you have no control over it.
Identity is the fundamental quality which makes us who we are. It may have no physical counterpart, but that doesn't make it any less real. I am demonstrably a different person than my brother is, who would react to the same stimuli differently. This is because though we may look the same and share a boatload of biological qualities, our life experiences and emotional make-up are different and therefore our identity differs.
Even animals have distinct and recognisable identities and personalities, as anyone who has owned pets knows.
What controls it is irrelevant. What matters is that we share an identity.